Prosecutorial Ethics in Retrospect by Green, Bruce A.
Fordham Law School
FLASH: The Fordham Law Archive of Scholarship and History
Faculty Scholarship
2017
Prosecutorial Ethics in Retrospect
Bruce Green
Fordham University School of Law, bgreen@law.fordham.edu
Follow this and additional works at: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/faculty_scholarship
Part of the Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by FLASH: The Fordham Law Archive of Scholarship and History. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Faculty Scholarship by an authorized administrator of FLASH: The Fordham Law Archive of Scholarship and History. For more
information, please contact tmelnick@law.fordham.edu.
Recommended Citation
Bruce Green, Prosecutorial Ethics in Retrospect, 30 Geo. J. Legal Ethics 461 (2017)
Available at: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/faculty_scholarship/868
Prosecutorial Ethics in Retrospect
BRUCE A. GREEN*
ABSTRACT
This Essay examines the ethical regulation of prosecutors over the past three
decades. The topic is important from the perspective of criminal justice, no less
than legal ethics, because prosecutors are centrally responsible for administer-
ing the criminal law. Courts assume that the principal role in regulating
prosecutors should be played by the states' formal attorney disciplinary
processes rather than by civil liability or judicial oversight in criminal cases.
However, there has been a well-justified academic and professional consensus
that the disciplinary processes fail to fulfill their expected role because, when it
comes to prosecutors, ethics rules are neither sufficiently restrictive nor
adequately enforced. Consequently, proponents of criminal justice reform seek to
hold prosecutors more accountable for conduct that undermines the fairness and
reliability of the criminal justice process, in part, by advocating for stricter ethics
rules governing prosecutors' work and stricter enforcement of existing rules
applicable to prosecutors. Those seeking prosecutorial ethics reform face an
uphill battle, however, given the significant political influence of prosecutors,
who are armed with a checklist of justifications for opposing efforts to regulate
their conduct more strictly through the disciplinary process. Consequently,
holding prosecutors more accountable may require either developing and
strengthening alternatives to formal discipline or restructuring the process by
which ethics rules for prosecutors are fashioned and enforced.
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INTRODUCTION
Recently, proponents of criminal justice reform have sought to hold prosecu-
tors more accountable for conduct that undermines the fairness and reliability of
the criminal justice process.1 Their efforts are fueled in part by the innocence
movement, which has shown how prosecutorial misconduct leads to wrongful
2 3yconvictions, and by a general public disillusionment with criminal justice.
Although prosecutors might be held accountable in various ways, including
through civil liability, ad hoc judicial oversight, and internal self-regulation,4
courts assume that professional regulation should play the principal role.5
Building on this understanding, advocates of greater prosecutorial accountability
seek, among other things, stricter ethics rules governing prosecutors' work and
stricter enforcement of existing rules applicable to prosecutors.6 But prosecuto
rial ethics reform faces challenges from prosecutors themselves, who have
considerable political clout and can offer abundant arguments against stricter
ethics regulation.7
In honor of this Journal's impressive thirty-year contribution to the legal ethics
scholarship, this Essay examines the ethical regulation of prosecutors since the
mid-1980s.8 This retrospective shows that ethics rules and disciplinary proceed-
ings have not lived up to their promise in overseeing prosecutors. Part I uses a
case of a wrongful conviction to illustrate the deficiency of both ethics rules and
1. See Bruce A. Green & Ellen Yaroshefsky, ProsecutorialAccountability 2.0, 92 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 51
(2016) [hereinafter Green & Yaroshefsky, ProsecutorialAccountability 2.0].
2. See id. at 93 95; see also Peter A. Joy, The Relationship Between Prosecutorial Misconduct and Wrongful
Convictions: Shaping Remedies for a Broken System, 2006 Wis. L. REv. 399; Daniel S. Medwed, Emotionally
Charged: The Prosecutorial Charging Decision and the Innocence Revolution, 31 CARDOZO L. REv. 2187
(2010).
3. Green & Yaroshefsky, ProsecutorialAccountability 2.0, supra note 1, at 87 93.
4. Id. at 61 66; see also Bruce A. Green, Policing Federal Prosecutors: Do Too Many Regulators Produce
Too Little Enforcement?, 8 ST. THOMAS L. REv. 69 (1995) [hereinafter Green, Policing Federal Prosecutors].
5. See, e.g., Connick v. Thompson, 563 U.S. 51, 66 (2011); Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409,429 (1976).
6. See, e.g., ANGELA J. DAVIS, ARBITRARY JUSTICE: THE POWER OF THE AMERICAN PROSECUTOR 180-83 (2007);
Bruce A. Green & Samuel J. Levine, Disciplinary Regulation of Prosecutors as a Remedy for Abuses of
Prosecutorial Discretion: A Descriptive and Normative Analysis, 14 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 143 (2016); Bruce A.
Green, Prosecutorial Ethics as Usual, 2003 ILLINOIS L. REv. 1573 [hereinafter Green, Prosecutorial Ethics as
Usual].
7. See infra Part V.
8. This Essay has also turned into a retrospective of my own scholarship on prosecutors' ethics, written over
the same thirty-year period.
[Vol. 30:461
PROSECUTORIAL ETHICS IN RETROSPECT
their enforcement. Parts II, III, and IV describe how professional conduct rules
have been developed, interpreted, and enforced over the past three decades.
Finally, Part V discusses the roadblock that prosecutors present to efforts to
develop more demanding ethics rules to govern their conduct or to enforce
existing rules more strictly. The Essay concludes that more robust regulation of
prosecutors' conduct will require strengthening alternative regulatory mecha-
nisms or restructuring the process by which ethics rules for prosecutors are
fashioned.
I. THE UNDERLYING STATE OF PROSECUTORIAL ETHICS
Wilton Dedge spent twenty-two years in prison, much of it in solitary
confinement, after he was wrongly convicted of brutally raping and assaulting a
twenty-year-old Florida woman in her home.9 He is one of hundreds of innocent
people who have been exonerated years after being found guilty. 1O After Dedge's
exoneration, Armen Merjian, a civil rights lawyer, published an article exploring
in-depth what went wrong in the case in order to illustrate flaws in the criminal
justice system in general. 1 One might also ask more specifically in exoneration
cases such as this one, "Where were the prosecutors?" 12 In Dedge's case, the
inquiry yields insights into the deficiencies of prosecutorial regulation in
particular.
As Merjian highlighted, Dedge's case illustrates several recurring evidentiary
problems in criminal cases. 13 One, long understood, is the unreliability of
eyewitness identifications offered by prosecutors in criminal cases. 14 In the
hospital after she was attacked, while her recollection was most recent, the victim
said her assailant was at least six feet tall with hazel eyes, but much later she
identified Dedge, who was five feet five inches tall with blue eyes, as her
assailant. 15 Another problem is the untrustworthiness of much of prosecutors'
forensic evidence. 16 At Dedge's trial, a police dog handler was allowed to testify
that more than a month after the rape, he conducted a so-called "scent lineup" and
9. Armen H. Merjian, Anatomy of a Wrongful Conviction: State v. Dedge and What It Tells Us About Our
Flawed Criminal Justice System, 13 U. PA. J.L. & Soc. 137 (2009).
10. See NAT'L REGISTRY OF EXONERATIONS, http://www.law.umich.edu/special/exoneration/Pages/about.aspx
[https://perma.cc/3A9U-BULX] (last visited Mar. 26, 2017).
11. Merjian, supra note 9.
12. See Bruce A. Green, Access to Criminal Justice: Where Are the Prosecutors?, 3 TEX. A&M L. REv. 515
(2016); see also Bruce A. Green, Beyond Training Prosecutors About Their Disclosure Obligations: Can
Prosecutors'Offices Learn From Their Lawyers'Mistakes, 31 CARDOZO L. REV. 2161 (2010).
13. The summary of Dedge's case in Part I of this Essay is based on Armen Merjian's account and critique.
See Merjian, supra note 9.
14. See, e.g., ELIZABETH F. LOFTUS, EYEWITNESS TESTIMONY (1979); Samuel R. Gross, Loss of Innocence:
Eyewitness Identification and Proof of Guilt, 16 J. LEGAL STUD. 395 (1987).
15. Merjian, supra note 9, at 141-43.
16. See, e.g., BRANDON L. GARRETT, CONVICTING THE INNOCENT: WHERE CRIMINAL PROSECUTIONS Go WRONG
7 9 (2011); NAT'L RESEARCH COUNCIL, STRENGTHENING FORENSIC SCIENCE IN THE UNITED STATES: A PATH
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concluded (without advancing any legitimate scientific foundation) that his
German Shepherd found a match between Dedge's scent and the scent on the
victim's bed sheets. 17 A third problem is the use of perjurious "jailhouse snitch
testimony." '18 After Dedge's first conviction was overturned on procedural
grounds, the police secured false testimony from a jailhouse informant who,
seeking to reduce his sentence, had a prior history of fabricating other inmates'
confessions.19
In retrospect, while one might blame the witnesses, the police, the trial judge,
or the evidence law, the prosecutors deserve blame for convicting and punishing
Dedge for a crime he did not commit while letting the actual rapist go
unpunished. Prosecutors have a gatekeeping obligation to refrain from prosecut-
ing doubtful cases constructed on unreliable evidence.20 As Merjian noted, the
prosecutors "never should have brought the case in the first place., 21 Nor should
they have offered unreliable eyewitness evidence, the dog handler's opinion that
lacked a legitimate scientific foundation, or the jailhouse informant's lies-all of
which, from a reasonable prosecutor's perspective at the time, should have
fostered skepticism. The prosecutors also deserve blame for mischaracterizing
forensic evidence regarding a hair found at the crime scene. The prosecutors
suggested to the jury that there was a match with Dedge's hair, when the contrary
was true: The prosecution's expert found differences between Dedge's hair and
the hair found at the crime scene, although the differences were not enough to
"entirely eliminate Dedge as a possible source" of the hair.22
The prosecutors' conduct over the years following Dedge's trial was no less
culpable. Prosecutors' post-trial obligations to rectify injustices are as compelling
as their pretrial obligation to avoid injustices.23 In Dedge's case, however, the
FORWARD (2009); PRESIDENT'S COUNCIL OF ADVISORS ON SCI. & TECH., FORENSIC SCIENCE IN THE CRIMINAL
COURTS: ENSURING SCIENTIFIC VALIDITY OF FEATURE-COMPARISON METHODS (2016).
17. Merjian, supra note 9, at 142-43.
18. THE JUSTICE PROJECT, JAILHOUSE SNITCH TESTIMONY: A POLICY REVIEW (2007); see also Jessica A. Roth,
Informant Witnesses and the Risk of Wrongful Convictions, 53 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 737 (2016).
19. Merjian, supra note 9, at 145-47.
20. See, e.g., Jane Campbell Moriarty, "Misconvictions," Science, and the Ministers of Justice, 86 NEB. L.
REV. 1 (2007).
21. Merjian, supra note 9, at 166.
22. Id. at 142-43.
23. See generally Judith A. Goldberg & David M. Siegel, The Ethical Obligations of Prosecutors in Cases
Involving Postconviction Claims of Innocence, 38 CAL. W. L. REV. 389 (2002); Bruce A. Green & Ellen
Yaroshefsky, Prosecutorial Discretion and Post-Conviction Evidence of Innocence, 6 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 467
(2009) [hereinafter Green & Yaroshefsky, Post-Conviction Evidence of Innocence]; Laurie L. Levenson, The
Problem With Cynical Prosecutor's Syndrome: Rethinking a Prosecutor's Role in Post-Conviction Cases, 20
BERKELEY J. CRIM. L. 335 (2015); David Luban, The Conscience of a Prosecutor, 45 VAL. U. L. REV. 1, 15
(2010); Daniel S. Medwed, The Prosecutor as Minister of Justice: Preaching to the Unconverted from the
Post-Conviction Pulpit, 84 WASH. L. REV. 35, 47 58 (2009); Fred C. Zacharias, The Role of Prosecutors in
Serving Justice After Convictions, 58 VAND. L. REV. 171 (2005).
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prosecutors frustrated his lawyers' efforts to show that he was wronged. 2 When
the jailhouse informant recanted, prosecutors refused to reconsider the evidence
and opposed Dedge's new trial motion. After the advent of DNA analysis,
prosecutors denied a request from Innocence Project lawyers to test the hair from
the crime scene and vigorously opposed Dedge's attempts in court to secure DNA
testing.26 When the defense finally won this right, and DNA experts concluded
that the hair was not Dedge's, prosecutors still fought his release, arguing that it
was inconsequential whether the hair belonged to Dedge and that, anyway, even
his innocence would not warrant a judicial remedy. 27 After having adamantly
resisted DNA testing earlier, the prosecutors prolonged Dedge's incarceration by
insisting that new DNA testing techniques be used to test semen from the crime
scene. Only after further testing confirmed Dedge's innocence did the prosecutors
stop fighting to keep him locked up.
28
After Dedge won his freedom, his father commented that the state attorneys
"should be disbarred, and they should spend time in jail.",29 This was not
unreasonable. The public might expect there to be repercussions, and perhaps
even criminal liability, for prosecutors who acted with others to put an innocent
man behind bars and keep him there. One might wonder, at the very least, why
there was no professional discipline-not even a public admonition. Were there
no relevant ethics rules? Were disciplinary authorities indifferent?
Dedge's case illustrates how ethics rules fall short. Even if the prosecutors
were personally convinced that Dedge was innocent, the ethics rules allowed
them to prosecute Dedge, argue that he was guilty, and leave it to the jury to
decide his fate, as long as there was "probable cause.",30 Moreover, even if the
prosecutors disbelieved the victim's identification of Dedge, the dog handler's
dog-sniff identification, and the jailhouse informant's account, and even if any
reasonable prosecutor would have found all of this evidence incredible, the rules
permitted prosecutors to put any or all of it before the jury.31 Trial lawyers
24. This is not an unusual reaction by prosecutors in exoneration cases. See Daniel S. Medwed, The Zeal
Deal: Prosecutorial Resistance to Post-Conviction Claims of Innocence, 84 B.U. L. REv. 125 (2004).
25. Merjian, supra note 9, at 146-48.
26. Id. at 150 56.
27. Id. at 155 59.
28. Id. at 159460.
29. Id. at 161.
30. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.8(a) (2016) [hereinafter MODEL RULES] (requiring
prosecutors to refrain from prosecuting charges they know are not supported by probable cause). See generally
Green & Yaroshefsky, Post-Conviction Evidence of Innocence, supra note 23, at 497 502 (comparing "probable
cause" standard with more demanding standards that some prosecutors voluntarily employ in their gatekeeping
role).
31. With respect to informants in particular, the ethics rules allow prosecutors to engage in conduct that tends
to foster false testimony while concealing having done so. While generally restraining advocates from offering
inducements to fact witnesses that may influence their testimony, prosecutors may expressly or tacitly promise
their informants leniency in exchange for testifying. See, e.g., R. Michael Cassidy, "Soft Words of Hope":
Giglio, Accomplice Witnesses, and the Problem of Implied Inducements, 98 Nw. L. REv. 1129 (2004). As long as
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generally may offer testimony and other evidence as long as they do not know it
to be false, and shockingly, the rules impose no higher standard on prosecutors
to ensure that their evidence is truthful and reliable.32 And years later, the
prosecutors could oppose Dedge's post-conviction applications even if the
prosecutors were, or reasonably should have been, entirely convinced of his
innocence, as Florida had not adopted a proposed rule, ABA Model Rule 3.8(h),
which would have required prosecutors to remedy wrongful convictions when
there was clear and convincing evidence that the defendant was innocent.33
Dedge's case also illustrates the failure of ethics enforcement. Prosecutors are
professionally blameworthy in many of the cases where innocent defendants
have been convicted and punished.34 At the very least, the prosecutors might be
sanctioned for their incompetence in putting an innocent man in prison and then
fighting to keep him there, insofar as they acted unreasonably.35 Alternatively, the
prosecutors might be sanctioned for engaging in "conduct prejudicial to the
administration of justice," for undertaking a course of conduct resulting in
punishing an innocent man for more than two decades. But disciplinary
authorities rarely if ever seek to punish prosecutors for unreasonable conduct in
cases like Dedge's.
A prosecutor's job is to seek justice, which means, among other things,
avoiding the punishment of innocent people and rectifying wrongful convic-
tions. 36 Professional regulation is supposed to ensure that lawyers-prosecutors
among them-do their jobs. But prosecutorial regulation has never adequately
ensured that prosecutors protect innocent people from wrongful punishment and
prosecutors do not intentionally or knowingly elicit perjury, prosecutors may exploit their power and leverage to
obtain testimony that supports their theory of the case and use other interviewing techniques that are as likely to
elicit false testimony as truthful testimony. See generally Ellen Yaroshefsky, Cooperation with Federal
Prosecutors: Experiences of Truth Telling and Embellishment, 68 FORDHAM L. REV. 917 (1999). Prosecutors
have no obligation to record their meetings with informants or to provide the recordings to the defense to enable
it to expose how the informant may have been induced to lie. See generally Sam Roberts, Note, Should
Prosecutors Be Required to Record Their Pretrial Interviews with Accomplices and Snitches?, 74 FORDHAM L.
REV. 257 (2005).
32. See MODEL RULES R. 3.3(3); cf STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, The Prosecution Function, Standard
3-6.6(a) (Am. Bar Ass'n 4th ed. 2015) [hereinafter ABA PROSECUTION STANDARDS] ("The prosecutor should not
offer evidence that the prosecutor does not reasonably believe to be true, whether by documents, tangible
evidence, or the testimony of witnesses. When a prosecutor has reason to doubt the truth or accuracy of
particular evidence, the prosecutor should take reasonable steps to determine that the evidence is reliable, or not
present it."). See generally Green & Yaroshefsky, ProsecutorialAccountability 2.0, supra note 1, at 59 & n.42.
33. See MODEL RULES R. 3.8(g), 3.8(h) (addressing prosecutors' post-conviction obligations upon learning
new exculpatory information); infra notes 74-79 and accompanying text (discussing Rule 3.8(g), 3.8(h)).
34. See generally BRYAN STEVENSON, JUST MERCY (2014).
35. See MODEL RULES R. 1.1 (duty of competence); R. 3.8, cmt. 1 ("Competent representation of the
sovereignty may require the prosecutor to undertake some procedural and remedial measures as a matter of
obligation."). See generally Fred C. Zacharias & Bruce A. Green, The Duty to Avoid Wrongful Convictions: A
Thought Experiment in the Regulation ofProsecutors, 89 B.U. L. REv. 1 (2009) [hereinafter Zacharias & Green,
Duty to Avoid Wrongful Convictions].
36. MODEL RULES R. 3.8 cmt. 1; see infra notes 39-46 and accompanying text.
[Vol. 30:461
PROSECUTORIAL ETHICS IN RETROSPECT
otherwise seek justice. Professional conduct rules overlook a range of prosecuto-
rial conduct that undermines the fairness and reliability of criminal proceed-
ings.37 And disciplinary authorities often overlook prosecutorial misconduct even
when it could be punished under existing rules.3 8
In theory, the ethical regulation of prosecutors can be strengthened in any of
three ways: (1) Courts can adopt additional rules governing prosecutors'
professional conduct or amend current rules to make them more demanding; (2)
courts can interpret the existing rules to demand more from prosecutors; and (3)
state-court disciplinary authorities, which seek to discipline lawyers who violate
the state's professional conduct rules, can enforce existing rules more rigorously
in cases of prosecutorial misconduct. But over the past three decades, as the next
three Parts describe, advances have been minor and sporadic.
II. RULES REGULATING PROSECUTORS
The organized bar is generally skeptical of the idea that standards of conduct
should differ depending on what type of law lawyers practice. 39 The bar makes an
exception for prosecutors, however. Prosecutors have long been thought to have a
distinctive responsibility "to see that justice is done."'40 Among other things, this
means that, in some respects, prosecutors have more demanding professional
obligations than other advocates-for example, a more demanding duty of
candor,41 and a heightened obligation to promote fair processes and reliable
outcomes.4 2 Further, prosecutors necessarily have some additional professional
obligations simply because their job is different-for example, prosecutors have
professional obligations relating to their unique decisions about bringing charges
and plea bargaining.4 3 Of course, the idea of "seeking justice" is vague and, in
itself, does not tell prosecutors how to answer tough questions in these and other
37. See infra Part II.
38. See infra Part IV.
39. See generally Bruce A. Green, Should There Be a Specialized Ethics Code for Death-Penalty Defense
Lawyers?, 29 GEo. J. LEGAL ETHICS 527 (2016) [hereinafter Green, Specialized Ethics Code].
40. CANONS OF PROF'L ETHICS Canon 5 (1908) [hereinafter 1908 CANONS]. See generally Kenneth Bresler,
Pretty Phrases: The Prosecutor as Minister of Justice and Administrator of Justice, 9 GEo. J. LEGAL ETHICS
1301 (1996); Bennett L. Gershman, The Zealous Prosecutor As Minister of Justice, 48 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 151
(2011); Bruce A. Green, Why Should Prosecutors "Seek Justice"?, 26 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 607 (1999)
[hereinafter Green, "Seek Justice"?]; Samuel J. Levine, Taking Prosecutorial Ethics Seriously: A Consideration
of the Prosecutor's Ethical Obligation to "Seek Justice" in a Comparative Analytical Framework, 41 HouS. L.
REv. 1337 (2004).
41. ABA PROSECUTION STANDARDS, Standard 3-1.4(a) ("In light of the prosecutor's public responsibilities,
broad authority and discretion, the prosecutor has a heightened duty of candor to the courts and in fulfilling
other professional obligations."). See generally Bruce A. Green, Candor in Criminal Advocacy, 44 HOFSTRA L.
REv. 1105 (2016) [hereinafter Green, Candor].
42. See MODEL RULES R. 3.8 cmt. 1.
43. See Green & Levine, supra note 6, at 152 55 (discussing application of ethics rules to prosecutors'
charging decisions).
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contexts. 44
There is an expanding academic literature exploring how prosecutors should
conduct their work in light of their heightened and special obligations. Many of
the writings address how prosecutors should resolve particular ethics issues that
may arise in individual criminal cases.45 Academic writings have also begun to
focus on how prosecutors, as public officials, should address systemic problems
such as underfunding of criminal defense, excessive sentencing and prison
overcrowding, and how prosecutors should otherwise seek public-interested law
reform.
46
One might expect rule drafters to make a comparable effort to give specific,
concrete meaning to prosecutors' distinctive professional obligations. After all,
leaving it to prosecutors to decide for themselves what it means to "seek justice"
in any given situation is a doomed regulatory strategy if one wants prosecutors to
get the right answer and act accordingly. 47 History shows that in the absence of
disciplinary regulation, many prosecutors will be indifferent to the idea of
"seeking justice," even when courts and legal ethicists espouse the concept.48 For
instance, it is not always easy to convince prosecutors that, as a matter of
self-restraint, they should forego doing what the laws and rules permit to convict
people they think are guilty.49 And even prosecutors committed to self-regulation
may lack sufficient time and objectivity to intuit what "seeking justice" entails in
the rough and tumble of a fast-moving criminal prosecution.
44. See Bennett L. Gershman, A Moral Standard for the Prosecutor's Exercise of Charging Discretion, 20
FORDHAM URB. L.J. 513, 519 (1993); Green, "Seek Justice"?, supra note 40, at 622; Alex Kreit, Reflections on
Medical Marijuana Prosecutions and the Duty to Seek Justice, 89 DEN. U. L. REv. 1027, 1030 (2012).
45. See generally, e.g., R. Michael Cassidy, Character and Context: What Virtue Theory Can Teach Us
About a Prosecutor's Ethical Duty to "Seek Justice", 82 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 635 (2006) [hereinafter Cassidy,
Character and Context]; Melanie D. Wilson, Prosecutors "Doing Justice" Through Osmosis Reminders to
Encourage a Culture of Cooperation, 45 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 67 (2008); Fred C. Zacharias, Structuring the Ethics
ofProsecutorial Trial Practice: Can Prosecutors Do Justice?, 44 VAND. L. REV. 45 (1991).
46. See R. Michael Cassidy, (Ad)ministering Justice: A Prosecutor's Ethical Duty to Support Sentencing
Reform, 45 Loy. U. CHI. L.J. 981, 983 (2014). See generally, e.g., Angela J. Davis, The Prosecutor's Ethical
Duty to End Mass Incarceration, 44 HOFSTRA L. REv. 1063 (2016); Bruce A. Green, Criminal Neglect: Indigent
Defense from an Ethics Perspective, 52 EMORY L.J. 1169 (2003); Bruce A. Green, Gideon's Amici: Why Do
Prosecutors So Rarely Defend the Rights ofthe Accused?, 122 YALE L.J. 2336 (2013).
47. Some critics of the Model Rules have suggested that lawyers should generally have more leeway to
resolve their ethical problems on their own, but there is nothing to suggest that lawyers were more ethical in the
days when there was less professional regulation. In general, arguments for more professional guidance seem
more compelling. See generally Green, Specialized Ethics Code, supra note 39.
48. See generally Carolyn B. Ramsey, The Discretionary Power of "Public" Prosecutors in Historical
Perspective, 39 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 1309 (2002).
49. See, e.g., Bruce A. Green & Ellen Yaroshefsky, Prosecutors' Ethics in Context: Influences on
Prosecutorial Disclosure, in LAWYERS IN PRACTICE: ETHICAL DECISION MAKING IN CONTEXT 269, 274 (Leslie C.
Levin & Lynn Mather eds., 2012) (noting disparity on prosecutors' discovery policies which, in some offices,
are limited to what the law requires).
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For the most part, prosecutors are governed by precisely the same rules as
other advocates.5 0 The generally applicable provisions do not address aspects of
prosecutorial conduct, such as charging and plea bargaining, that are unique to
criminal prosecution. Further, the one-size-fits-all rules often fit prosecutors
badly. As Dedge's case illustrates, it is wrong to treat prosecutors like ordinary
advocates when it comes to offering evidence and testimony of questionable
reliability and veracity; prosecutors should not have license to offer unreliable,
incredible evidence simply because they do not know it is false.5 i The threshold is
also too low for prosecutors when it comes to filing motions and making legal
arguments: anything goes as long as prosecutors' legal and factual assertions are
not frivolous.52 Even if other advocates can do so, it is wrong for prosecutors to
make baseless (albeit not "frivolous") arguments for strategic benefit-for
example, unfounded disqualification and sanctions motions that needlessly
consume defense lawyers' time and resources and potentially undermine
defendants' trust in their lawyers. Compounding the problem of prosecutors'
unmeritorious (though not necessarily frivolous) arguments is that courts,
understanding prosecutors to be "ministers of justice," often give prosecutors the
benefit of the doubt.53
The ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct include one rule specifically
targeted at prosecutors, Rule 3.8, titled "Special Responsibilities of a Prosecu-
tor." It is where one would hope to find more rigorous obligations than the ones
set forth in the generally applicable rules, as well as find standards of conduct for
aspects of prosecutors' work that are unique. But Rule 3.8 barely scratches the
surface.54 This is unsurprising because rule drafters have developed Rule 3.8
piecemeal over time rather than systematically studying prosecutors' conduct to
determine what obligations and restrictions are warranted.
As of 1986, Rule 3.8 had five provisions, two of which, sections (a) and (d),
were carried over from the ABA Model Code of Professional Responsibility.
Model Rule 3.8(a), forbidding the prosecution of a charge that the prosecutor
knows is not supported by probable cause, codifies one constitutional restriction
50. See, e.g., MODEL RULES R. 3.1 3.7, 4.1-4.4, 8.2 8.4. The significant exceptions are Rule 1.11, which
governs government lawyers' conflicts of interest, and Rule 3.8, titled "Special Responsibilities of a
Prosecutor."
51. MODEL RULES R. 3.3; see supra note 32 and accompanying text; see also Green, Prosecutorial Ethics as
Usual, supra note 6, at 1596; Green & Yaroshefsky, ProsecutorialAccountability 2.0, supra note 1, at 59 n.42.
52. MODEL RULES R. 3.1.
53. Cf Rice v. Collins, 546 U.S. 333, 337 (2006) (trial judge gave prosecutor the benefit of the doubt
regarding the reasons for exercising a peremptory challenge).
54. See generally Stephanos Bibas, Prosecutorial Regulation Versus Prosecutorial Accountability, 157 U.
PA. L. REv. 959 (2009); Samuel C. Damren, The Special Responsibilities of the Prosecutor with Respect to
Crime Labs, Plea Agreements, Trial Evidence, Impaired Defense Counsel and Brady, CRIM. L. BRIEF, Spring
2013, at 2; Green, Prosecutorial Ethics as Usual, supra note 6; Niki Kuckes, The State of Rule 3.8:
Prosecutorial Ethics Reform Since Ethics 2000, 22 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 427 (2009).
55. MODEL CODE OF PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY DR 7-103(A), (B) (1980).
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on prosecutors' exercise of the power to bring criminal charges. 6 Otherwise,
Model Rule 3.8 leaves charging and plea bargaining to prosecutors' discretion. 7
Model Rule 3.8(d) requires the disclosure of "evidence or information known to
the prosecutor that tends to negate the guilt of the accused or mitigates the
offense" or the sentence. On its face, this provision demands more than the due
process decisions beginning with Brady v. Maryland8 that require prosecutors
to disclose "material" exculpatory and impeachment evidence.5 9 But, as of the
mid-1980s, courts and disciplinary agencies essentially ignored the provision,
and so prosecutors did too.
The other three provisions, originating in the Model Rules, were similarly
inconsequential. To the extent that states adopted them-and not all states
did-they have rarely been taken seriously by courts or enforced in disciplinary
proceedings. One provision requires prosecutors to give defendants an opportu-
nity to obtain counsel.60 Another forbids prosecutors from seeking waivers of
certain pretrial rights from unrepresented defendants,6 1 while not addressing the
more common and consequential practice of seeking waivers of trial and
post-conviction rights.62 The third provision calls on prosecutors to attempt to
restrain their investigators and employees from violating the rule regulating
prosecutors' out-of-court statements in the media.6 3 This adds little to existing
rules requiring all lawyers to take reasonable steps to prevent subordinates from
engaging in ethical misconduct.64
Some commentators have envisioned the possibility that Rule 3.8 be reviewed
and comprehensively amended, or that the existing rules be supplemented by a
specialized ethics code for prosecutors, to more fully codify the unique and more
demanding normative expectations for prosecutors' conduct.6 5 But the ABA has
added to the rule only modestly over the past three decades.
56. Green, Prosecutorial Ethics as Usual, supra note 6, at 1587 91.
57. See generally Brandon K. Crase, When Doing Justice Isn't Enough: Reinventing the Guidelines for
Prosecutorial Discretion, 20 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 475 (2007). Several states have added additional restrictions
on prosecutors' exercise of charging power. See Green & Levine, supra note 6, at 152.
58. 373 U.S. 83 (1963).
59. See, e.g., Cone v. Bell, 556 U.S. 449, 470 n.15 (2009) ("Although the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment, as interpreted by Brady, only mandates the disclosure of material evidence, the
obligation to disclose evidence favorable to the defense may arise more broadly under a prosecutor's ethical or
statutory obligations.").
60. MODEL RULES R. 3.8(b); see MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT (1983) [hereinafter 1983 MODEL RULES].
61. MODEL RULES R. 3.8(c); see 1983 MODEL RULES.
62. See infra notes 110 16 and accompanying text.
63. MODEL RULES R. 3.8(f); see 1983 MODEL RULES. This provision was originally Rule 3.8(e) but later
combined with a later-added restriction on out-of-court speech.
64. MODEL RULES R. 5.2; see also MODEL RULES R. 8.4(a).
65. See, e.g., Roberta K. Flowers, A Code of Their Own: Updating the Ethics Codes to Include the
Non-Adversarial Roles of Federal Prosecutors, 37 B.C. L. REv. 923, 963 (199 6 ) (advocating the adoption of
clear standards for prosecutors to reflect their distinctive role); Kuckes, supra note 54, at 462 ("Meaningful
reform in the prosecutorial ethics rule may finally be within reach, if ethics regulators can learn the lessons from
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Most controversially, the ABA added a new provision in 1990 to address
prosecutors' practice of issuing grand jury subpoenas to lawyers for testimony
concerning their current or past clients.66 Federal prosecutors had increasingly
begun employing this investigative measure, principally in conspiracy cases. For
example, in narcotics and organized crime cases, when criminal defendants
without a legitimate source of income came to court with private lawyers,
prosecutors sometimes questioned the lawyers about how their legal fees were
paid and by whom. The lawyers' grand jury testimony was of potential
investigative or evidentiary value-for example, it might establish whether the
client was paying legal fees with ill-gotten gain, or whether he had a benefactor
who was engaged in conspiratorial wrongdoing.67 Although the fee information
sought by prosecutors was not necessarily protected by the attorney-client
privilege, defense lawyers complained that prosecutors were improperly intrud-
ing into the attorney-client relationship and undermining clients' trust in their
lawyers. The Model Rules provision, based on a Massachusetts counterpart,
required prosecutors to obtain court approval and to exhaust other options before
subpoenaing a lawyer to testify before the grand jury about a client. Federal
prosecutors aggressively opposed states' adoption of the provision, and in various
jurisdictions where it was adopted, they initiated lawsuits to bar its enforcement,
arguing that the provision unduly interferes with the prerogatives of the federal
grand jury. In 1994, after the Third Circuit struck down a state attorney-subpoena
restriction based on the ABA model, the ABA attempted to deflect further legal
challenges by amending its version of the attorney-subpoena restriction to
remove the requirement of judicial approval. However, the rule has still been
successfully challenged for unduly interfering with the federal grand jury's
independence.68 Although many states have Rule 3.8(e) on the books, 69 it is
questionable whether the provision has an impact in the federal grand jury
investigations at which it was principally directed.
While achieving little from a regulatory perspective, the battle over the
attorney-subpoena restriction fueled prosecutors' antagonism toward the ABA.70
Prosecutors point to the provision as one among several items of evidence to
support their impression that the ABA has been captured by the criminal
Ethics 2000-that there is the political will among many leaders within the criminal justice community to tackle
the rules governing prosecutorial ethics, but a patient, persistent, and inclusive process is critical."); supra note
6 and accompanying text.
66. See generally Max D. Stern & David A. Hoffman, Privileged Informers: The Attorney Subpoena
Problem and a Proposal for Reform, 136 U. PA. L. REV. 1783 (1988); Fred C. Zacharias, A Critical Look at
Rules Governing Grand Jury Subpoenas of Attorneys, 76 MINN. L. REV. 917 (1992).
67. See Stern v. U.S. Dist. Court, 214 F.3d 4, 18 (1st Cir. 2000).
68. See generally United States v. Supreme Court of N.M., 839 E3d 888 (10th Cir. 2016); Stern, 214 E3d
at4.
69. See Kuckes, supra note 54, at 445 50.
70. See generally Nancy J. Moore, Intra-Professional Warfare Between Prosecutors and Defense Attorneys:
A Plea for an End to the Current Hostilities, 53 U. PiTr. L. REv. 515 (1992).
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defense bar.7 1
In 1994, the earlier restrictions on extra-judicial communications were
supplemented by a provision restricting prosecutors from making public
statements that would heighten condemnation of the accused.72 The provision has
rarely been noted and even more rarely enforced through discipline, even though
transgressions are publicly conspicuous. For example, no public discipline
followed when U.S. Attorney Patrick Fitzgerald announced that Illinois Governor
Rod Blagojevich's alleged conduct "would make Lincoln roll over in his
grave, 73 or when U.S. Attorney Preet Bharara made extensive public comments
about government corruption while his office was pursuing a high-profile
corruption case.7 4 Given the spectacle of highly regarded prosecutors publicly
ignoring the ethics rule with impunity, one cannot avoid deducing that ethical
restraints on prosecutors' extrajudicial statements are precatory, toothless, or in
the internet era, obsolete.75
When the ABA's Ethics 2000 Commission set to work from 1997 to 2002 to
comprehensively review and amend the Model Rules, it essentially left Rule 3.8
untouched. The ABA received proposals for new rules to codify conventional
understandings about how prosecutors should conduct their work. However,
prior battles with prosecutors had made the ABA gun-shy. It made a deliberate
decision to stay away from prosecutorial ethics reform in order to avoid further
debate and controversy and to try to restore prosecutors' confidence.76
The ABA rule drafters did not return to Rule 3.8 until 2008, when, in the wake
of the innocence movement, they added the current Rules 3.8(g) and (h), which
address prosecutors' post-conviction duties.7 7 Rule 3.8(g) requires prosecutors to
reexamine a conviction when they receive substantial new evidence of innocence
and to disclose the evidence to the defense, while Rule 3.8(h) requires them to
seek a remedy when it becomes clear from their review that their office convicted
an innocent person.
71. See Bruce A. Green, Prosecutors and Professional Regulation, 25 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 873, 875 (2012)
[hereinafter Green, Prosecutors and Professional Regulation]; Green, Prosecutorial Ethics as Usual, supra note
6, at 1585. Prosecutors also took issue with a comment to Rule 3.8 that indicated that prosecutors had a duty to
present exculpatory evidence to the grand jury. Id. at 1581 (citing 1983 MODEL RULES R. 3.8 cmt. 1).
72. This was initially Rule 3.8(g). The two earlier provisions are now combined into the current Model Rule
3.8(f).
73. Victoria Toensing, Fitzgerald Should Keep His Opinions to Himself, WALL ST. J., Dec. 13, 2008.
74. See United States v. Silver, 103 E Supp. 3d 370, 373 (2015) (denying former public official's motion to
dismiss indictment, but observing: "the Court does not condone the Government's brinksmanship relative to the
Defendant's fair trial rights or the media blitz orchestrated by the U.S. Attorney's Office in the days following
Mr. Silver's arrest").
75. See generally Emily Anne Vance, Note, Should Prosecutors Blog, Post, or Tweet?: The Need for New
Restraints in Light ofSocial Media, 84 FORDHAM L. REv. 367 (2015).
76. See Green, Prosecutorial Ethics as Usual, supra note 6, at 1585 87.
77. See generally Michele K. Mulhausen, Comment, A Second Chance at Justice: Why States Should Adopt
ABA Model Rules ofProfessional Conduct 3.8(g) and (h), 81 U. COLO. L. REv. 309 (2010).
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The ABA rule drafters did not expect these provisions to meet resistance and,
indeed, when they were circulated for comment, prosecutors had no substantial
normative objections, only suggestions for re-wording. The provisions basically
accord with professional and judicial expectations that prosecutors will not
ignore evidence of a wrongful conviction. 78 No prosecutor seriously argued that
the public interest in finality outweighed the need to look at significant new
evidence that raises serious doubts about an inmate's guilt. Over the course of the
lengthy ABA revision and adoption process, the drafters (myself among them)
sought to accommodate prosecutors' concerns about wording while reminding
them that the provisions were only models and could be modified by states in
light of their distinctive laws, processes, and traditions. The drafters also
emphasized that the provisions were not meant to target "well-intentioned
prosecutors who make considered judgments" about whether to reopen investiga-
tions or support motions to overturn convictions.79 In a further attempt to win
over prosecutors, the drafters added an unusual comment stating that prosecutors
do not violate these provisions when they conclude erroneously, but in good faith,
that new exculpatory evidence does not trigger their duty to act.80
Even so, some (though not all) federal and state prosecutors subsequently
opposed states' adoption of these provisions, typically interposing theoretical
arguments against judicial oversight or predicting that the floodgates would open
to frivolous disciplinary complaints.81 Lawmakers, including courts, traditionally
give significant deference to prosecutors' views about how new laws will affect
their work. Nonetheless, by mid-2017, seventeen jurisdictions had adopted Rules
3.8(g) and (h) or a modified version.8 2 None subsequently reported that
prosecutors' earlier fears were substantiated. This has not quelled prosecutors'
opposition, however. The Department of Justice (DOJ) still refuses to endorse the
ABA model provisions or to offer its own alternatives to give concrete ethical
expression to prosecutors' inarguable duty "to rectify the conviction of innocent
persons. 83 Many state prosecutors follow the DOJ's lead.84
78. See, e.g., Warney v. Monroe Cty., 587 F.3d 113, 125 n.15 (2d Cir. 2009).
79. Stephen A. Saltzburg, Changes to Model Rules Impact Prosecutors, CRIM. JUST., Spring 2008, at 14.
80. MODEL RULES R. 3.8 cmt. 9.
81. See Green, Prosecutors and Professional Regulation, supra note 71, at 891 93.
82. See AM. BAR. ASS'N, CPR POLICY IMPLEMENTATION COMM., VARIATIONS OF THE ABA MODEL RULES OF
PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT: RULE 3.8(G) AND (H) (Mar. 29, 2017), http://www.americanbar.org/contenUdam/aba/
administrative/professional-responsibility/mrpc_3_8_g h.authcheckdam.pdf [https://perma.cc/DH3D-A6SH]
(Arkansas, Arizona, Colorado, Delaware, Hawaii, Idaho, Illinois, Massachusetts, New Mexico, New York,
North Carolina, North Dakota, Tennessee, Washington, West Virginia, Wisconsin, and Wyoming). As of the end
of 2016, authorities in five other jurisdictions California, the District of Columbia, Nebraska, Pennsylvania,
and Vermont were considering whether to adopt these or comparable provisions. Id.
83. MODEL RULES R. 3.8 cmt. 1.
84. For example, in 2012, comments opposing the amendment of the Arizona rules to add provisions based
on Model Rules 3.8(g) and (h) were filed in the Arizona Supreme Court not only by the U.S. Attorney's Office
for the District of Arizona, but also by the Arizona Prosecuting Attorneys' Advisory Council, the Maricopa
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To some extent, the ABA seeks to compensate for the deficiency of the rules by
adopting legally-unenforceable "standards"-the ABA Prosecution Function
Standards85 -that reflect the organization's view of how good prosecutors
should generally behave.8 6 But these "aspirational" bar association guidelines do
not ensure that prosecutors will "seek justice" throughout their work. There is
nothing to suggest that prosecutors are generally aware of them and accept them
as expressions of how prosecutors should generally behave. Although courts
occasionally cite them, there is no evidence that many courts actively encourage
prosecutors to abide by them. Moreover, one might question whether the
Standards are sufficiently demanding even as a collection of purely aspirational
guidelines.8 7
III. INTERPRETATIONS OF RULES REGULATING PROSECUTORS
In theory, courts could demand more of prosecutors under generally applicable
rules, given prosecutors' unique duty to seek justice. This is true, in part, because
some rules are extremely open-textured. For example, a rule forbidding "conduct
County Attorney, and the Pima County Attorney. See R-11 -0033 Petition to Amend ER 3.8, Rule 42, Arizona
Rules of the Supreme Court, ARIZ. COURT RULES FORUM, https://www.azcourts.gov/Rules-Forum/aft/322
[https://perma.cc/RFC6-9NQ7] (last updated Oct. 28, 2013). In 2016, similar proposed provisions were
opposed by the North Carolina Conference of District Attorneys on behalf of forty-four District Attorneys of
that state. Letter from Andrew Murray, N.C. Conference of Dist. Attorneys, to Alice Mine, N.C. State Bar (June
24, 2016) (on file with author).
85. ABA PROSECUTION STANDARDS. See generally Bruce A. Green, Developing Standards of Conduct for
Prosecutors and Criminal Defense Lawyers, 62 HASTINGS L.J. 1093 (2011); Rory K. Little, The ABA's Project to
Revise the Criminal Justice Standards for the Prosecution and Defense Functions, 62 HASTINGS L.J. 1111
(2011).
86. See, e.g., ABA PROSECUTION STANDARDS, Standard 3-4.3(a) ("A prosecutor should seek or file criminal
charges only if the prosecutor reasonably believes that ... admissible evidence will be sufficient to support
conviction beyond a reasonable doubt, and that the decision to charge is in the interests of justice."); ABA
PROSECUTION STANDARDS, Standard 3-5.4(g) ("A prosecutor should not avoid pursuit of information or evidence
because the prosecutor believes it will damage the prosecution's case or aid the accused."); ABA PROSECUTION
STANDARDS, Standard 3-6.6(a) ("The prosecutor should not offer evidence that the prosecutor does not
reasonably believe to be true, whether by documents, tangible evidence, or the testimony of witnesses. When a
prosecutor has reason to doubt the truth or accuracy of particular evidence, the prosecutor should take
reasonable steps to determine that the evidence is reliable, or not present it.").
87. For example, Standard 3-6.8(a) provides: "The prosecutor may argue all reasonable inferences from the
evidence in the record, unless the prosecutor knows an inference to be false." ABA PROSECUTION STANDARDS,
Standard 3-6.8(a). One might question whether, accepting their role as gatekeepers, prosecutors should argue
inferences that they reasonably believe, but do not personally know, to be false. Standard 3-4.3(d) provides: "A
prosecutor's office should not file or maintain charges if it believes the defendant is innocent, no matter what the
state of the evidence." ABA PROSECUTION STANDARDS, Standard 3-4.3(d). This standard also seems to give
inadequate weight to prosecutors' role in ensuring the reliability of the criminal process. Cf RUSSELL G. PEARCE
ET AL., PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY: A CONTEMPORARY APPROACH 668 (2d ed. 2014) ("[Flor generations,
before determining whether a case should proceed to trial, felony prosecutors in New York County have insisted
that they be personally convinced beyond a reasonable doubt of the defendant's guilt, and believe themselves
able to prove that guilt to a jury.") (quoting prosecution's motion to dismiss indictment in People v.
Strauss- Kahn (2011)).
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that is prejudicial to the administration of justice"88 gives courts wide latitude to
proscribe conduct that undermines the fairness or reliability of the adversarial
process. But even when interpreting less vague rules, courts have considerable
discretion because courts themselves adopt the ethics rules and are therefore not
required by separation-of-powers principles to honor the drafters' intent as courts
are when interpreting legislation. 9
But courts are often inclined to go in the opposite direction-to interpret rules
less restrictively for prosecutors-out of deference to prosecutors' judgment
about the exigencies of their work.90 For example, lawyers are generally
forbidden from providing inducements to witnesses in exchange for their
testimony. 91 But prosecutors are substantially exempted from this restriction.92
Courts defer to prosecutors' customary practice of securing accomplice wit-
nesses' testimony by giving them immunity from prosecution, reducing criminal
charges, or limiting their punishment. Because prosecutors can void cooperation
agreements if they disbelieve cooperating witnesses, these witnesses have
powerful incentives to tell prosecutors what they want or expect to hear.93
The professional conduct rules forbidding false statements and dishonest and
deceitful conduct offer another example of prosecutorial exceptionalism. 94 In
general, the ethics rules foreclose lawyers and their agents from lying or
engaging in deceit,95 and in some respects prosecutors are expected to be more
candid than other lawyers.96 But courts do not apply these restrictions to
prosecutors who authorize their agents to engage in trickery to obtain confessions
and other inculpatory evidence.
Most controversially, courts interpret state counterparts to Model Rule 4.2, the
no-contact rule, more liberally with regard to prosecutors.98 In general, lawyers
and their investigators may not question someone who is represented by counsel
in the matter.99 But courts generally hold that, at least prior to the formal
commencement of criminal proceedings, prosecutors may send investigators to
speak with witnesses and suspects who are represented in connection with the
88. MODEL RULES R. 8.4(d).
89. See generally Green & Levine, supra note 6, at 150 nn.42-43.
90. See generally Fred C. Zacharias & Bruce A. Green, The Uniqueness of Federal Prosecutors, 88 GEO. L.J.
207 (2000) [hereinafter Zacharias & Green, Uniqueness of Federal Prosecutors].
91. See MODEL RULES R. 3.4(b) (forbidding inducements to witnesses that are forbidden by law). See
generally Bruce A. Green, There but for Fortune: Real-Life vs. Fictional "Case Studies" in Legal Ethics, 69
FORDHAM L. REv. 977 (2000).
92. See Zacharias & Green, Uniqueness ofFederal Prosecutors, supra note 90, at 221.
93. See Yaroshefsky, supra note 31, at 952 53.
94. See MODEL RULES R. 4.1, 8.4(c).
95. See MODEL RULES R. 8.4(a), (c).
96. See generally Green, Candor, supra note 41, at 1115 19.
97. See Zacharias & Green, Uniqueness of Federal Prosecutors, supra note 90, at 221 22; cf Joel Cohen,
When a Detective Deceives And the Lawyer Knows It, N.Y. L.J., Dec. 12, 2016.
98. See Zacharias & Green, Uniqueness ofFederal Prosecutors, supra note 90, at 219 20.
99. MODEL RULES R. 4.2.
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investigation.1 00
The question of whether the no-contact rule restrains prosecutors' investigative
activities sparked controversy in the 1980s and '90s. Concerned that courts were
beginning to apply the rule more seriously to prosecutors, the Department of
Justice took the position in the so-called Thornburgh Memo that its prosecutors
were not subject to the no-contact rule and then issued a regulation early in
Attorney General Janet Reno's tenure that was meant to substitute for the rule.10O
At least momentarily, congressional and judicial confidence in the DOJ
diminished as a result. While litigation ensued over the legal effectiveness of the
DOJ regulation, Congress mooted the question by adopting legislation, known as
the McDade Amendment, providing that federal prosecutors were subject to the
ethics rules of the states in which they worked. 102 While confirming that federal
prosecutors, as lawyers, were subject to courts' supervisory authority over the
bar, 10 3 the federal law changed little as far as the no-contact rule was concerned,
because courts generally did not read the rule more strictly, as the DOJ feared
they might.104 Further, in a fence-mending effort, the ABA adopted a comment to
Model Rule 4.2 acknowledging judicial decisions that authorize prosecutors and
their agents to question represented suspects during investigations. 1
0 5
That said, in the past three decades courts have occasionally applied ethics
rules to prosecutors to impose meaningful obligations and restrictions beyond
those established by constitutional or statutory law or criminal procedure rules.
Most importantly, while courts, disciplinary authorities, and prosecutors have
sometimes tended to ignore the plain meaning of Rule 3.8(d), as discussed above,
several courts have interpreted Rule 3.8(d) in accordance with its plain language,
which requires prosecutors to disclose favorable evidence in their possession
without regard to its materiality and to do so with reasonable promptness before
trial. 10 6 This contrasts with the constitutional case law under the Brady v.
100. See, e.g., United States v. Sabean, No. 2:15-CR-175-GZS, 2016 WL 5721135, at *4 (D. Me. Oct. 3,
2016).
101. For a discussion of this history, see generally Bruce A. Green, Whose Rules of Professional Conduct
Should Govern Lawyers in Federal Court and How Should the Rules Be Created?, 64 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 460
(1996).
102. See generally Zacharias & Green, Uniqueness of Federal Prosecutors, supra note 90; Rima Sirota,
Reassessing the Citizens Protection Act: A Good Thing It Passed, and a Good Thing It Failed, 43 Sw. L. REv. 51
(2013).
103. For discussion of courts' supervisory authority to regulate federal prosecutors, see generally Bruce A.
Green & Fred C. Zacharias, Regulating Federal Prosecutors'Ethics, 55 VAND. L. REv. 381 (2002).
104. See, e.g., United States v. Balter, 91 F.3d 427, 435 (3d Cir. 1996); United States v. Grass, 239 F. Supp.
2d 535, 549 (M.D. Pa. 2003); United States v. Ward, 895 F. Supp. 1000, 1003-06 (N.D. Ill. 1995). But see
United States v. Koerber, 966 E Supp. 2d 1207, 1225 34 (D. Utah 2013).
105. MODEL RULES R. 4.2 cmt. 5.
106. See generally, e.g., In re Kline, 113 A.3d 202 (D.C. App. 2015); In re Disciplinary Action Against
Feland, 820 N.W.2d 672 (2012); In re Larsen, 379 P.3d 1209 (2016). The court opinions follow the lead of bar
association ethics opinions. See ABA Comm. on Ethics & Prof'l Responsibility, Formal Op. 09-454 (2009);
NYS Bar Ass'n Comm. on Prof'l Ethics, Op. 2016-3 (2016). See generally Green & Levine, supra note 6, at
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Maryland line of constitutional decisions, which hold that a conviction will not
be set aside for a prosecutor's failure to disclose exculpatory and impeachment
evidence unless it was "material" in the sense that its disclosure might have led to
an acquittal. 107 That several courts seemed to strike an important blow simply by
reading Rule 3.8(d) to mean what it says suggests how deferential courts have
usually been to prosecutors. And the battle is still joined, because a relatively
equal number of courts have neutered Rule 3.8(d) by interpreting it to add
nothing to the constitutional case law, despite plain language to the contrary. 1
0 8
Notably, in disciplinary cases against federal prosecutors in Massachusetts and
the District of Columbia, the DOJ has endorsed this approach. 109
Also of note, several decisions have held prosecutorial conduct to be
"prejudicial to the administration of justice" 1 0 or otherwise punishable when it
appears to be grossly unfair even if not contrary to a specific rule.111 Most
significantly, following the lead of various bar association ethics committees, the
Kentucky Supreme Court ruled it to be improper for federal prosecutors to
negotiate, as a condition of a favorable plea bargain, for the defendant to waive a
future ineffective assistance of counsel claim.1 12 The court reasoned that making
this waiver a condition of a plea agreement poses a conflict of interest for the
defense lawyer, who will have a self-interest in encouraging the defendant to
waive an ineffectiveness claim, especially if such a claim were viable. 113 The
Kentucky decision led the DOJ to change its plea bargaining policy to cease the
waiver practice nationally.
1 14
But at the same time, courts have allowed prosecutors to use their leverage in plea
bargaining to obtain waivers of procedural rights that are equally consequential-in
particular, waivers of appellate and post-conviction challenges to illegal sen-
tences or to prosecutorial misconduct (such as discovery violations) that only
later come to light.1 15 Courts have not been troubled by the argument "that these
162 63; Bruce A. Green, Prosecutors 'Ethical Duty ofDisclosure In Memory of Fred Zacharias, 48 SAN DIEGO
L. REv. 57 (2011); Kirsten M. Schimpff, Rule 3.8, The Jencks Act, and How the ABA Created a Conflict Between
Ethics and the Law on Prosecutorial Disclosure, 61 AM. U. L. REv. 1729 (2012).
107. See generally Bruce A. Green, Federal Criminal Discovery Reform: A Legislative Approach, 64
MERCER L. REV. 639, 645-47 (2013).
108. See generally, e.g., Disciplinary Counsel v. Kellogg-Martin, 923 N.E.2d 125 (Ohio 2010); Okla. Bar
Ass'n v. Ward, 353 P.3d 509 (2015).
109. See Green & Levine, supra note 6, at 162 n.116 (citing DOJ amicus).
110. See MODEL RULES R. 8.4(d).
111. See Green & Levine, supra note 6, at 176-80.
112. United States v. Ky. Bar Ass'n, 439 S.W.3d 136, 157 58 (Ky. 2014).
113. Id.
114. Memorandum from James M. Cole, Deputy Attorney Gen., U.S. Dep't of Justice, Department Policy on
Waivers of Claims of Ineffective Assistance of Counsel (Oct. 14, 2014), http://pdfserver.amlaw.com/nlj/DOJ-
IneffectiveAssistanceCounsel.pdf [https://perma.cc/SK57-NUJL].
115. Bruce A. Green, The Right to Plea Bargain with Competent Counsel After Cooper and Frye: Is the
Supreme Court Making the Ordinary Criminal Process "Too Long, Too Expensive, and Unpredictable ... in
Pursuit of Perfect Justice"?, 51 DUQUESNE L. REV. 735, 742-44 (2013).
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waivers reflect an abuse of prosecutorial power, given the public interest in
ensuring that criminal proceedings are fair and that significant procedural errors
are corrected."1
1 6
In sum, courts have done relatively little over the past thirty years to
compensate for the limited reach of the ethics rules by interpreting them to give
fuller expression to the "duty to seek justice." With rare exception, courts remain
deferential to prosecutors, even interpreting the rules to be less demanding in
some respects with regard to prosecutors' work.
IV. ENFORCEMENT OF ETHICS RULES
In the academic literature on the regulation of prosecutors, it is virtually a
truism that disciplinary authorities do not take prosecutorial misconduct seriously
enough. 1 1 7 The debate is mostly over just how bad disciplinary enforcement has
been. This is hard to answer because of the opacity of most disciplinary systems.
One can only speculate about how often prosecutorial misconduct comes to
disciplinary authorities' attention but goes unpunished. Some have suggested that
critics overestimate the amount of prosecutorial misconduct, as in the case of
Judge Alex Kozinski's recent reference to an "epidemic" of prosecutorial
discovery violations,11 8 or overstate the rarity of disciplinary actions against
prosecutors. l 9 But virtually none of the literature asserts that disciplinary
enforcement plays an adequate role in regulating prosecutors.
Critics have illustrated the problem by pointing to disciplinary authorities'
failure to sanction prosecutors who make improper jury arguments and who
engage in other courtroom misconduct. 120 Improper arguments in particular are
proscribed by generally applicable ethics rules, 12 1 occur right under a trial
judge's nose, and are recorded. Trial judges can send transcripts of improper
arguments to the disciplinary authorities, and disciplinary authorities can also
learn of some improper arguments from appellate decisions. Appellate judges
have themselves complained when prosecutors make improper arguments in the
face of prior judicial opinions setting boundaries and issuing stern warnings. 122
116. Id. at 742.
117. See generally, e.g., Angela J. Davis, The Legal Profession's Failure to Discipline Unethical
Prosecutors, 36 HOFSTRA L. REv. 275 (2007); Bennett L. Gershman, "Hard Strikes and Foul Blows": Berger v.
United States 75 Years After, 42 Loy. U. CHI. L.J. 177 (2010); Walter W. Steele, Unethical Prosecutors and
Inadequate Discipline, 38 Sw. L.J. 965 (1985).
118. See Green & Yaroshefsky, supra note 1, at 67 70 (discussing Judge Kozinski's observation).
119. See generally, e.g., Fred C. Zacharias, The Professional Discipline of Prosecutors, 79 N.C. L. REv. 721
(2001).
120. See generally, e.g., Albert W. Alschuler, Courtroom Misconduct by Prosecutors and Trial Judges, 50
TEX. L. REv. 629 (1972).
121. See, e.g., MODEL RULES R. 3.4(e).
122. See generally, e.g., United States v. Modica, 663 F.2d 1103 (2d Cir. 1981); Bell v. State, 723 So. 2d 896
(Fla. App. 1988); State v. Salitros, 499 N.W.2d 815 (Minn. 1993); Green & Yaroshefsky, supra note 1, at 63.
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But for all this, disciplinary authorities rarely take prosecutors to task for this
misconduct, at least as far as one can tell from published disciplinary deci-
sions. 123 Likewise, despite reported cases where prosecutors made discrimina-
tory peremptory challenges and then offered insincere reasons for doing so,
disciplinary authorities virtually never punish this misconduct.124
Critics have also long complained of the lack of disciplinary enforcement
when prosecutors improperly withhold evidence. 125 While most discovery
violations are probably never revealed, some later become the subject of motion
and appellate practice. Prosecutors have been chastised in court decisions or
otherwise shamed for withholding evidence that should have been produced. 126
But professional discipline under the ethics rules rarely follows. 127
To some extent, rule drafters appear to share disciplinary agencies' ambiva-
lence toward disciplining prosecutors. As noted, a comment to Rule 3.8 cautions
that prosecutors cannot be tagged with misconduct when they make a "good
faith" but erroneous judgment that new exculpatory evidence need not be
disclosed or investigated. 128 Overlooking lawyers' good faith errors might be a
good principle for disciplinary enforcement in general. 129 But prosecutors are
virtually the only lawyers who benefit from a good faith exception in the ethics
rules. 1 3
0
One can understand disciplinary agencies' reluctance to battle with prosecu-
tors. 131 Even so, in recent years, there seems to be a slight upsurge in discipline
cases against prosecutors, 132 which may be a response to increasing public
pressure to hold prosecutors accountable for misconduct. 133 Perhaps the tide is
turning. But as long as the applicable ethics rules remain incomplete and unduly
permissive, there are limits to how effective professional discipline can be in
regulating prosecutors' conduct.
123. See Green & Levine, supra note 6, at 156.
124. See Lonnie T. Brown, Jr., Racial Discrimination in Jury Selection: Professional Misconduct, Not
Legitimate Advocacy, 22 REv. LImG. 209, 282 (2003).
125. See, e.g., Richard A. Rosen, Disciplinary Sanctions Against Prosecutors for Brady Violations: A Paper
Tiger, 65 N.C. L. REv. 693 (1987). The ethics rules squarely address this conduct. See, e.g., MODEL RULES R.
3.4(a), 3.8(d).
126. On courts' use of "shaming" to influence prosecutors' conduct, see Lara Bazelon, For Shame: The Public
Humiliation of Prosecutors by Judges to Correct Wrongful Convictions, 29 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 305 (2016).
127. For a brief description of how the disciplinary rules have recently been enforced against prosecutors,
see Green & Levine, supra note 6, at 155 63. The article describes several recent cases in which discipline was
imposed against prominent prosecutors, including the Attorneys General of Kansas and Pennsylvania.
128. MODEL RULES R. 3.8 cmt. 9.
129. See Green, Specialized Ethics Code, supra note 39, at 557.
130. The other context where this concept arises is when a subordinate lawyer reasonably relies on a
superior's reasonable but erroneous resolution of an ethics question. MODEL RULES R. 5.2(b).
131. See, e.g., Zacharias & Green, Duty toAvoid Wrongful Convictions, supra note 35, at 52 56 (identifying
institutional reasons why disciplinary agencies would not enforce the competence rule against prosecutors).
132. See Green & Levine, supra note 6, at 157463; Green & Yaroshefsky, supra note 1, at 82 83.
133. Cf Green & Yaroshefsky, supra note 1, at 82 83.
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V. IMPEDIMENTS TO ETHICS REGULATION
Reviewing thirty years of prosecutorial ethics regulation, one might initially
form the impression that the ABA has fallen down on the job. State courts rely on
the ABA to draft rules of professional conduct rather than doing this work
themselves. 134 Those who write about prosecutorial ethics have called attention
to the inadequacy of the Model Rules.135 But the ABA has never tried to fully
develop the rules for prosecutors. Instead, it has devoted its effort to unenforce-
able, aspirational standards. The current Standards serve an important function in
the absence of fully developed rules. They assist well-intentioned prosecutors
who are willing to regulate themselves, as seekers of justice, beyond the
enforceable rules. But mere standards are not enough. Prosecutors who do only
what the law and rules require, ignoring the Standards, cannot be held
accountable for abusive conduct.
It would be unfair to blame the ABA, however. It would be virtually futile for
the ABA to propose special rules of prosecutorial ethics over the opposition of
prosecutors, especially federal prosecutors. And opposition would be almost
inevitable. The thirty-year review of prosecutorial ethics is largely a story about
federal prosecutors' obstruction of ethics regulation at every turn: the DOJ
opposed the application of the no-contact rule, going so far as to promulgate a
federal regulation establishing its own standard; 136 federal prosecutors opposed
states' adoption of the attorney subpoena rule and then challenged its constitution-
ality in federal courts; 13 7 the DOJ to this day rejects the plain wording of the
disclosure rule; 138 and it also still opposes states' adoption of rules establishing
prosecutors' post-conviction obligations. 139
While the ABA might not worry about other lawyers' uncooperativeness,
prosecutors are not just any lawyers. They are politically powerful public
officials who have the ear and sympathy of the judiciary. It is unlikely that state
judiciaries will adopt comprehensive rules for prosecutors if prosecutors do not
actively participate in the drafting process and endorse the rules. Moreover, the
ABA works closely with prosecutors on other aspects of criminal justice reform
and cannot afford to antagonize them by proposing wholesale reform of
prosecutors' ethics over their objection. It's just not worth it.
For their part, prosecutors can tick off more than a dozen reasons why the ABA
should not be trusted to propose rules of prosecutors' ethics, and why virtually
134. See Fred C. Zacharias & Bruce A. Green, Rationalizing Judicial Regulation of Lawyers, 70 OHIO ST.
L.J. 73, 94 95 (2009).
135. See, e.g., DAVIS, supra note 6, at 150 51; MONROE FREEDMAN & ABBE SMITH, UNDERSTANDING
LAWYERS' ETHICS 295 96, 309 (4th ed. 2010). See generally Kuckes, supra note 54.
136. See supra notes 101-02.
137. See supra notes 66 69.
138. See supra note 109.
139. See supra notes 77 84.
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any proposed rule is inadequate, sight unseen, even if one accepts the underlying
normative premise, as in the case of Rules 3.8(g) and (h). The checklist of
arguments includes the following:
* Courts, bar associations, and disciplinary authorities should not be
making and enforcing rules for prosecutors because they don't know
how prosecutors should behave in any given situation. Prosecutors
know best. 1
40
* Courts, bar associations, and disciplinary authorities should not be
making rules for prosecutors because doing so usurps the legislative
function. Legislatures know best. 141
* The ABA in particular cannot be trusted because it has been captured
by the defense bar.
14 2
* Prosecutors' conduct is too complicated to be dictated by enforceable
rules. Determining how best to behave requires weighing complex
facts in light of multiple considerations. Prosecutors should be left to
decide what is best as a matter of independent professional judgment
informed by their experience. 143
* New ethics rules will lead to frivolous and oppressive disciplinary
complaints by inmates and defense lawyers, wasting prosecutors'
time and intruding into the confidentiality of their investigations and
prosecutions. 1
4 4
* The heightened risk of discipline created by additional rules will make
prosecutors overly cautious, impeding their effectiveness. 
145
* Defendants will use the new rules as the basis for motions in criminal
cases, taking up time and resources and potentially creating new,
unintended legal rights.
* The norms governing prosecutors are uncertain and contested.
Prosecutors who are elected or appointed, as public officials in a
democratic process, should have authority to resolve questions about
140. See Zacharias & Green, Duty to Avoid Wrongful Convictions, supra note 35, at 49 52 (discussing
arguments directed at disciplinary authorities' institutional competence).
141. See Green, Prosecutors and Professional Regulation, supra note 71, at 892 93; see also Zacharias &
Green, Duty to Avoid Wrongful Convictions, supra note 35, at 47-48 (discussing concerns about aligning
disciplinary decisions with legislative and constitutional standards governing prosecutors).
142. See Green, Prosecutors and Professional Regulation, supra note 71, at 886 87 (discussing suggestion
by National District Attorneys Association (NDAA) that Rule 3.8(d) was a product of ABA partisanship).
143. See Cassidy, Character and Context, supra note 45, at 640 (arguing that prosecutors should rely on
virtue ethics where conduct standards cannot be codified).
144. See Green, Prosecutors and Professional Regulation, supra note 71, at 888 (discussing NDAA claim
that prosecutors will be chilled by the fear of disciplinary allegations under Rule 3.8(d)); id. at 892 (discussing
state prosecutors' concern about disciplinary actions under Rules 3.8(g) and (h)); Zacharias & Green, Duty to
Avoid Wrongful Convictions, supra note 35, at 43-46.
145. See Zacharias & Green, Duty to Avoid Wrongful Convictions, supra note 35, at 39-41 (discussing risk
that disciplinary rules will lead to over-deterrence of prosecutors).
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proper prosecutorial conduct based on their own informed judgments,
subject to political accountability, not judicial oversight. 146
* Ethics rules are almost invariably over-inclusive; one can imagine
scenarios where the rule might be interpreted to forbid conduct that
does not deserve to be punished.
* Ethics rules are invariably uncertain in meaning, resulting in the
possibility that prosecutors will be confused, and that courts will
interpret the rules in ways that are unanticipated, unintended, inappro-
priate, and oppressive. 
147
* Ethics rules are invariably drafted imperfectly, and prosecutors can
point out imperfections (without necessarily suggesting improvements).
* New ethics rules for prosecutors are unnecessary. There is no problem
of widespread prosecutorial misconduct. Whatever problems may
exist are best addressed by self-regulation. Singling out prosecutors
for new rules is unfair to them and demoralizing. 
148
Some arguments will be convincing some of the time. Courts should not adopt
every conceivable ethics rule for prosecutors. But at other times, prosecutors'
arguments against ethics regulation will be disingenuous and makeweight. It
cannot be that prosecutors should be exempt from all ethics rules. Certainly, state
judiciaries, the ultimate arbiters, do not doubt their own authority to adopt and
enforce ethics rules regulating prosecutors. 149 Nor can it be that the existing rules
are the best of all possible rules and that no others would be useful. 150
The problem is that prosecutors will not necessarily distinguish good ethics
regulation from bad but will reflexively oppose any proposed new rules
governing prosecutors' conduct. Prosecutors are supposed to act in the public
interest not their own self-interest, but in this context, their self-interest is hard to
resist. 151 No lawyers want to increase their own risk of disciplinary oversight and
sanctions. Sometimes, lawyers will see a compensating benefit, because their
opposing counsel are equally bound, but not when it comes to rules for
prosecutors alone. It is to the credit of many state prosecutors that, in discussions
regarding whether to adopt Rules 3.8(g) and (h) to regulate prosecutors'
post-conviction conduct, they disinterestedly supported states' adoption of these
provisions. 152
146. See Green, Prosecutors and Professional Regulation, supra note 71, at 894-95.
147. See Zacharias & Green, Duty to Avoid Wrongful Convictions, supra note 35, at 37 39 (discussing
problems for prosecutors caused by vague rules).
148. See id. at 36 37 (discussing problem of singling out prosecutors).
149. See Green & Levine, supra note 6, at 175 nn.178 79.
150. See Green, Prosecutorial Ethics as Usual, supra note 6, at 1601 03.
151. See generally Bruce A. Green & Rebecca Roiphe, Rethinking Prosecutors' Conflicts of Interest, 58
B.C. L. REv. 463 (2017).
152. See Green, Prosecutors and Professional Regulation, supra note 71, at 890-91.
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CONCLUSION
The lesson of the past three decades is that ethics rules and disciplinary
proceedings cannot realistically be relied on to play the primary role in regulating
prosecutors. If prosecutors are to be held more accountable, something must
change.
One possibility is to enhance other regulatory mechanisms, such as by
expanding civil liability or ad hoc judicial sanctions. At least on the federal level,
courts have shown little inclination to encourage civil lawsuits against prosecu-
tors by lowering the bars posed by doctrines of absolute and qualified immunity.
On the contrary, Supreme Court decisions have largely protected prosecutors
from civil lawsuits arising out of professional misconduct, in part based on the
stated assumption that professional discipline will fill the void. 153 On the other
hand, some judges in recent years have shown an increased willingness to inquire
into prosecutors' conduct when it appears wrongful. Some have even threatened
to impose contempt sanctions or other sanctions directly against individual
prosecutors who are blameworthy, although, for the most part, judges have been
more open to affording defendants remedies and to issuing informal admonish-
ments than to formally punishing prosecutors. 1 5 4 Additionally, legislative efforts
might be undertaken to impose additional disclosure obligations on prosecutors
or to regulate other aspects of their conduct, as has already occurred in some
states. 155
Alternatively, if ethics regulation is to live up to its promise, there is a need to
reform not just the ethics rules themselves but also the process by which ethics
rules regulating prosecutors are adopted. In recent years, the ABA has increas-
ingly examined how existing professional conduct rules apply to prosecutors'
conduct. 1 5 6 But the ABA cannot fairly be expected to play a central and assertive
rule-making role, given prosecutors' traditional opposition. State judiciaries
collectively need to take the reins from the ABA and establish their own
commission to develop a more comprehensive ethics code for prosecutors.
153. See Green & Yaroshefsky, supra note 1, at 64-65.
154. See id. at 73 75.
155. See id. at 75 78.
156. See id. at 80 81.
2017]

